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Abstract: 
In this paper, we aim at investigating if the conventional wisdom, that an increase of 
competition  linked  to  a  decrease  in  the  degree  of  product  differentiation  always 
reduces  firms’  profits,  remains  true  in  a  unionized  duopoly  model  with  labour 
decreasing returns. In this context, mixed results emerge. In particular, we show that 
a decrease in the degree of product differentiation may affect wages, hence profits, 
differently,  depending  on  both  the  mode  of  competition  in  the  product  market 
(Cournot or Bertrand competition) and the particular unionization structure (firm-
specific or industry-wide union(s)). Interestingly, it is shown that the conventional 
wisdom can actually be reversed, even if under Bertrand competition only. 
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1  Introduction 
 
A conventional wisdom in industrial economics suggests that a decrease in the degree of product 
differentiation  always  reduces  firms’  profits  by  increasing  the  intensity  of  product  market 
competition, irrespective of the fact that firms compete à la Cournot or à la Bertrand in the product 
market (e.g. Shy 1995, pp. 138-140). The reason behind this result can be understood by referring to 
the standard differentiated duopoly model, due to Singh and Vives (1984), in which a decrease in 
the degree of product market differentiation diminishes total demand and induces firms to compete 
more aggressively under both modes of competition, leading unambiguously to lower firms’ profits. 
Whilst in the standard Singh and Vives’s (1984) model firms’ marginal production costs are 
assumed to be constant and exogenously given, the growing literature on unionized oligopolies (see, 
e.g., the seminal works by Horn and Wolinsky 1988 and Dowrick 1989) relaxes such assumption by 
admitting that (labour) costs are the outcome of a strategic game played between firms and unions 
before the former compete between themselves in the product market. 
This paper investigates, in a unionized duopoly model, the effects on firms’ profits of an 
increase in competition linked to a decrease in the degree of product differentiation. In particular, in 
relation to the unionization structure, we will consider the case of monopoly union that can be either 
firm-specific or centralized (industry-wide).
1 Indeed, a salient dimension that differentiates national 
unionization structures is the degree of wage setting centralization (Calmfors and Driffill 1988; 
Freeman 1988; Layard and Nickell 1999; Flanagan 1999). At the industry level, a decentralized 
wage setting structure, involving firm-specific unions, is commonly contrasted with a completely 
centralized  one,  in  which  a  single  industry  union  sets  a  standard  wage  for  the  entire  industry. 
Particularly, while centralized unions representing all workers in an industry are widespread in 
Continental Europe, firm-specific unions and decentralized wage setting are largely predominant in 
UK, North America and Japan (e.g. Iversen 1998; Flanagan 1999).
2 
Furthermore, we also introduce another important novelty into the analysis by assuming that 
the production technology exhibits diminishing returns to labour, which also implies increasing 
marginal  costs.  Indeed,  although  the  latter  hypothesis  features  as  the  most  common  in 
                                                 
1 In the unionized oligopoly literature, the case of monopoly union is adopted, e.g., by Brekke (2004) and 
Lommerud et al. (2005). 
2 Recent  contributions  in  the  unionized  oligopoly  literature  analyze  the  role  of  unionization  structure 
(decentralized vs. centralized) in affecting innovation incentives (Haucap and Wey 2004; Mukherjee and 
Pennings 2011), incentives for foreign direct investment (Mukherjee and Zhao 2007) as well as profitability 
and welfare effects of downstream mergers (Brekke 2004; Lommerud et al. 2005; Symeonidis 2010).   3 
microeconomic modelling (at least, with reference to the short-run) and is adopted by other strands 
in oligopoly theory,
3 the effects that its introduction produces in a unionized oligopoly framework 
have so far not been investigated.
4 
Our main results can be summarized as follows. Even in the presence of labour decreasing 
returns, when wages are exogenously determined, the standard result that firms’ profits always 
decrease when competition increases (i.e. the degree of product differentiation decreases) remains 
valid. However, when unions endogenously fix wages, more mixed results do emerge. In such a 
case,  when  product  differentiation  decreases,  another  important  effect  acts  in  affecting  profits, 
together  with  the  standard  competition effect.  Furthermore,  whilst  the  latter  always  operates  in 
reducing profits, the former, that we term endogenous or union wage effect, can affect wages, hence 
profits,  differently,  depending  on  both  the  mode  of  competition  in  the  product  market  and  the 
particular unionization structure. Particularly, when wages are fixed by a central (industry-wide) 
union and firms compete à la Cournot in the product market, the union wage effect operates in same 
direction of the standard competition effect, hence it reinforces the latter in reducing profits when 
competition increases. By contrast, in the other possible cases (that is, Cournot competition with 
firm-specific unions and Bertrand competition, regardless of the unionization structure) it operates 
against the competition effect, at least for a certain range of the product differentiation parameter. 
At the same time, however, we show that, even when the union wage effect operates against the 
competition effect, the former can outweigh the latter only when firms compete à la Bertrand. 
Hence, only under this mode of competition in the product market, the conventional wisdom can 
actually be reversed. 
We note that Zanchettin (2006, section 4) also deals with the issue of this paper, i.e. the 
impact of the degree of product differentiation on equilibrium profits under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition.  In  particular,  Zanchettin  (2006)  modifies  the  Singh  and  Vives’s  (1984)  original 
framework by allowing for a wider range of cost and demand asymmetry between firms, and finds 
that, under both modes of competition, the efficient firm’s profit and industry profits as a whole can 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., White (1996) for mixed oligopoly models (De Fraja and Delbono 1990) and Perry and Porter 
(1985) and Heywood and McGinty (2007) in relation to the “merger paradox” in oligopolies. 
4 An exception is Fanti and Meccheri (2011) in which decreasing returns to labour have been introduced in a 
unionized duopoly model in order to compare profits under Cournot and Bertrand competition. In particular, 
it is shown that decreasing returns tend to reinforce the mechanisms that contribute to the “reversal result” 
(i.e. higher profits under Bertrand instead of under Cournot competition), making this event possible for a 
wider  range  of  situations,  with  respect  to  those  identified  by  the  previous  literature  (Correa-López  and 
Naylor 2004).   4 
decrease  with  the  degree  of  product  differentiation.
5 Our  paper  differs  from  Zanchettin  (2006) 
mainly because we relax the Singh and Vives’s standard assumptions by introducing, instead of the 
presence of asymmetric firms, the role of unions and labour decreasing returns into the analysis. As 
a consequence, our results and the mechanisms behind them are different. Indeed, our findings have 
to be mainly ascribed to the interaction between modes of competition, decreasing returns to labour 
and unionization structure, which is clearly absent in Zanchettin (2006). 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model 
and characterizes Cournot and Bertrand equilibria under exogenous wages. Section 3 introduces the 
role  played  by  (firm-specific  and  central)  unions  in  determining  wages  into  the  analysis.  Main 
results on the relationship between the degree of product differentiation (or market competition) and 
profits  under  different  modes  of  competition  and  unionization  structures  are  presented  and 
discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2  Model 
 
We consider a model of differentiated product market duopoly, in which each firm sets its output, 





U(qi, q j)  =   (qi  +  q j) 
  qi





where qi and qj denote outputs by firm i and j (i, j = 1, 2, i ≠ j), respectively, α > 0, and γ ∈ (0, 1) 
denotes the extent of product differentiation, with goods assumed to be imperfect substitutes. In 
particular,  notice  that  if  γ  would  be  equal  to  1,  the  products  of  the  two  firms  would  be 
undifferentiated, hence firms compete in the same market. At the other extreme, if γ would be equal 
to  0,  a  monopoly  would  apply  in  this  market.  Hence,  the  higher  γ,  the  higher  the  degree  of 
competition in the product market. The derived product market demand for the representative firm i 




pi(qi, q j)  =         q j     qi . 
                                                 
5 Zanchettin’s (2006) main focus is, however, comparing Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated 
duopoly with asymmetric firms.   5 
 
Let  assume  that  only  labour  input  is  used  for  production.  As  already  discussed  in  the 
Introduction, another literature’s standard assumption is that labour exhibits constant returns, which 
implies firms face constant marginal costs. In this paper, instead, we modify such hypothesis by 










2  represents the number of workers employed by the firm i to produce qi output units 
of the variety i. The choice of such specific technology, described by the functional form of (3), 
allows for analytical results and also implies that firms have quadratic costs, which is a typical 
example of increasing costs in the literature. 




  i = piqi   wiqi
2 
 
where wi is the per-worker wage paid by firm i, with wi < α. In what follows, we will consider the 
benchmark cases, in which wages are exogenously given for firms. In Section 3, instead, we will 
introduce the role of unions in determining wages into the analysis. 
 
2.1  Cournot competition with exogenous wages 
 
Taking  (2)  and  (4)  into  account,  profit-maximization  under  Cournot  competition  leads  to  the 









As  γ  >  0,  the  best-reply  functions  are  downward-sloping,  that  is,  under  the  Cournot 
assumption, the product market game is played in strategic substitutes. From (5), and its equivalent 
for firm j, we can obtain the firm i’s output for given wi and wj as: 




  2(1+ w j)   [ ]
4(1+ wi)(1+ w j)  
2  
 
and, by substituting (6) in (4), the firm i’s profit as: 
 (7) 
  
  i(wi,w j) =
 
2(1+ wi)    2(1+ w j) [ ]
2




By assuming exogenous wages, we have 
  
wi = w j = w , hence, by substituting in (6) and (7), 




qi = q j = qC =
 




  i =   j =  C =
 
2(1+ w )
2(1+ w )+   [ ]
2  
 
which represent the equilibrium output and profit, respectively, with exogenous wages and where 
the subscript C recalls that they are obtained under Cournot competition in the product market. As 
regards the object of this paper, it is easy to see from (9) that profit is positively correlated with the 
degree  of  product  differentiation  (which  is  decreasing  in  γ)  or,  in  other  words,  is  negatively 
correlated with the degree of market competition (which is increasing in γ). 
 
2.2  Bertrand competition with exogenous wages 
 
We  consider  now  the  case  in  which  the  product  market  game  is  characterized  by  price-setting 
behavior by firms, i.e. competition occurs à la Bertrand. From (2) and its counterpart for the firm j, 
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.   7 
From (11), the first-order condition for profit-maximization gives the firm i’s price choice, 





1+ 2wi   
2 ( )  (1  )+  p j [ ]




thus,  for  γ  >  0,  the  Bertrand  product  market  game  is  played  in  strategic  complements.  By 
substituting in (12) the corresponding equation for the firm j and solving for pi, we get the Bertrand 





  1+ 2wi   
2 ( ) 2(1+ w j)  (1+  ) [ ]
4(1+ wi)(1+ w j)+  
2  
2  2(wi + w j) 5 [ ]
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  2(1+ w j)  (1+  ) [ ]
4(1+ wi)(1+ w j)+  
2  
2  2(wi + w j) 5 [ ]
 
 




  i(wi,w j) =
 
2 2(1+ w j)  (1+  ) [ ]
2
1+ wi   
2 ( )
4(1+ wi)(1+ w j)  
2 2(wi + w j)+ 5  
2 [ ] [ ]
2 . 
 
Again, by assuming exogenous wages, we have 
  
wi = w j = w , hence, by substituting in (14) 




qi = q j = qB =
 




  i =   j =   B =
 
2 1+ w   
2 ( )
2(1+ w )+  (1  ) [ ]
2  
 
which represent the equilibrium output and profit, respectively, with exogenous wages and where 
the subscript B recalls that it is obtained under Bertrand competition in the product market. Note   8 
that, as in the Cournot case, it is easy to check from (17) that profit is clearly positively correlated 
with  the  degree  of  product  differentiation,  i.e.  equilibrium  profit  decreases  when  competition 
between firms increases. 
 
 
3  The unionized duopoly 
 
A common feature of the standard literature is that it implicitly assumes that the input markets are 
perfectly  competitive,  thus  ignoring  a  possible  role  of  the  input  markets  in  determining  the 
relationship between profits and the degree of market competition (i.e. product differentiation). In 
many  cases,  however,  such  assumption  does  not  properly  represent  real  world  situations.  For 
instance, labour markets are often unionized and an increasing literature on unionized oligopoly has 
been recently developed (e.g. Horn and Wolinsky 1988; Dowrick 1989; Naylor 1998, 1999; Correa-
López and Naylor 2004; Brekke, 2004; Lommerud et al. 2005; Correa-López 2007). In this section, 
we join such literature by admitting that labour cost is no longer exogenously given for firms, but it 
is the outcome of a strategic game played between each firm and a labour union. Firm’s and union’s 
behaviour incorporates two stages of decision. Decisions are taken at each stage anticipating the 
outcome of subsequent stages. 
Following the backward induction logic, in stage 2, as already analyzed in Section 2, each 
firm  decides,  according  to  the  product  market  competition  regime,  its  optimal  level  of  output, 
hence, given the technology, of factor inputs and the input price (i.e. the wage) as determined in the 
prior stage. In stage 1, instead, a monopoly union fixes wages. As well known, union objectives are 
not necessarily dominated by wages. In particular, in order to derive tractable results for wage 
determination, we assume – following many other works (e.g. Pencavel 1985; Dowrick and Spencer 
1994; Petrakis and Vlassis 2000) – that the union i’s utility takes the Stone-Geary functional form 
  
Vi = (wi   w°)
  li, where w° is the reservation wage that, for simplicity, we normalize to zero (w° = 
0),
6 while θ > 0 is a parameter that represents the degree of the union’s orientation towards wages, 
with respect to employment. In particular, a value of θ = 1 gives the rent-maximizing case, whilst 
smaller θ’s values imply that the union is less concerned about wages and more concerned about 
employment. Furthermore, as well known, unionization structure may differ significantly around 
the world. In this paper, we will concentrate our attention on two alternative unionization structures: 
a) firm-specific unions; and b) central union. 
 
                                                 
6 This will not affect qualitatively our results.   9 
3.1  Firm-specific unions 
 
When there are firm-specific unions, each of them concerns only about wages and employment of 









Since both firms are unionized, each union’s choices take place simultaneously across firms, 
taking the other firm’s wages as given. Hence, by substituting (6), for the Cournot case, and (14), 
for the Bertrand case, in (18) and maximizing with respect to wi, we get, according to the type of 
competition in the product market, the sub-game perfect best-reply function in relation to the wage, 
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In  symmetric  sub-game  perfect  equilibrium  wi  =  wj  =  w,  hence,  from  (19)  and  (20), 
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where the apex FS recalls that they are obtained with firm-specific unions. 
Finally, in order to derive explicit equilibrium solutions for firms’ profits, we use (21), (22), 
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2  




3.2  Central (industry-wide) union 
 
We consider now the case in which workers are organized in one industry-wide union. In such a 
case, since the central union takes industry employment as a whole (li + lj) into account and fixes a 








2 + q j
2). 
 
By substituting (6) and (14) in (25) and maximizing with respect to w, we get the central 

















where the apex C recalls that they are obtained with a central union. 
















2(2  ) 4   (4   ) [ ]
8(1+  )(2  )
2 . 
 
                                                 
7 Also notice that since, is such a case, there is only one union in the market, we do not need to denote its 
utility with the index i.   11 
Before  turning  to  analyze  the  profits’  behaviour  according  to  degree  of  product  market 
competition (i.e. product differentiation) in different contexts, we note that, as expected, wages 
increase with the wage-orientation parameter θ under both Cournot and Bertrand competition and 
with both firm-specific and central union(s) (see (21), (22), (26) and (27)). Moreover, wages are 
(strictly) positive for θ < 2. Hence, in order to preserve the economic meaningfulness of the model, 
in what follows we will admit that, and concentrate our analysis on the case with, θ ∈ (0, 2). 
 
 
4  Product market differentiation, competition and profits 
 
Basing on previous analysis, in this section, we are able to answer to the following issue: do the 
standard  results  with  exogenous  wages  described  in  Section  2,  that  increasing  competition  (i.e. 
passing from product full differentiation to no differentiation) always decreases profits, holds true 
in the presence of unions in the labour market? In what follows, we will argue that, if unions are 
sufficiently wage-interested, the answer to the question is negative. Furthermore, we will also show 
that both the type of competition in the product market and the particular nature of union’s structure 
play a role in answering to that question. 
In order to deeply analyze the issue, consider first that when, e.g., the degree of product 
market differentiation decreases, hence product market competition increases, two distinct effects 
affect firms’ profits. On the one hand, a direct effect of increasing market competition, which is 
clearly profit-reducing (we label this effect as “competition effect”). On the other hand, when wages 
are endogenously determined, there is also an indirect effect operating via wages (that we term 
“endogenous or union wage effect”) and its role in affecting profits is not clear-cut. 
In particular, when wages are exogenously given, the derivative of w with respect to γ is 
obviously  zero,  hence  the  endogenous  wage  effect  is  null.  In  such  a  case,  only  the  standard 
competition effect operates and, as already discussed in Section 2, we get the result that, regardless 
of  the  mode  of  competition  in  the  product  market,  profits  always  decrease  with  increasing 
competition. 
However, when unions endogenously fix wages, 
  
 w    is no longer zero (see (21), (22) and 
(26), (27)). Moreover, if the endogenous wage effect is positive and dominates the competition 
effect,  the  conventional  finding  on  profits  behaviour  according  to  degree  of  product  market 
competition may be reversed. Obviously, for such a result realizes, a crucial role is played, firstly, 
by how wages react to changing γ. Hence, we begin by presenting some preliminary results as   12 
regards the wage setting behaviour under alternative unionization structures, as well as the resulting 
relationships between wages and the degree of product differentiation. 
 
Lemma  1.  Under  both  Cournot  and  Bertrand  competition,  a  central  union  always  sets  higher 
wages than a firm-specific union. 
 
Proof. Lemma 1 straightforwardly follows from the comparison between equilibrium wages with 
firm-specific unions and central union ((21) with (22) and (26) with (27)): 
 
  
 wC = wC
FS   wC
C =  
2+       
2 (   2)+ 4
2(2  )
< 0,  
  
     (0,1) and     (0,2) 
  
 wB = wB
FS   wB
C =  
2( 
2  +1)  (  + )   
2  
2 + (   2)  4 [ ]+ 4
2(2  )
< 0,  
  
     (0,1) and     (0,2). 
□ 
 
For  a  better  understanding  of  the  Lemma  1,
8 it  is  worth  remarking  which  are  the  main 
differences between firm-specific and central unions’ behavior. A firm-specific union only takes 
care of employment at its own firm. Hence, in wage setting, unions tend to undercut each other in 
order to capture a larger fraction of the overall employment for their own firm. A central union, 
instead, takes care of total employment at the industry-wide level, which reduces the tendency to 
undercut wages. Therefore, we can claim that reducing inter-union competition in the labour market 
produces an higher wage, as stated by Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 2. Under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when competition increases (i.e. product 
differentiation decreases), the wage chosen by a firm-specific union decreases. 
 










2 (   2)+ 4
< 0,  
  
     (0,1) and     (0,2) 
                                                 
8 Notice that Lemma 1 extends the well-known result by Horn and Wolinsky (1988, Prop. 1) to the Bertrand-






   (   2)+ 2 
2   4 + 2(1  )  
2  
2 + (   2)  4 [ ]+ 4 [ ]
2(2  )  (   2)+ 2 
2   4 + 2(1  )  
2  
2 + (   2)  4 [ ]+ 4 [ ]
< 0,
  
     (0,1) and     (0,2). 
□ 
 
Lemma 3. While under Cournot competition the wage chosen by a central union always increases 
when  market  competition  increases  (i.e.  product  differentiation  decreases),  under  Bertrand 
competition the relationship between the wage chosen by a central union and the degree of market 
competition is “humped”: the wage increases (decreases) with increasing competition depending 
on whether the product differentiation parameter is lower (higher) than ½. 
 









> 0,  
  
     (0,2). 
 

















     (0,2). □ 
 
Lemmas 2 and 3 are not trivial and deserve some more comments.
9 Indeed, the reason why, 
when product market competition increases, results change according to the mode of competition 
and/or  to  the  unionization  structure  could  not  appear  straightforward.  In  order  to  explain  the 
intuition behind the previous findings, recall, firstly, that higher wages always imply lower output 
(i.e.  employment),  irrespective  of  whether  unions  are  centralized  or  firm-specific,  as  well  as 
whether  firms  compete  à  la  Cournot  or  à  la  Bertrand.  However,  in  alternative  scenarios 
employment  adjusts  differently  to  wage  changes,  also  depending  on  the  degree  of  product 
differentiation. In particular the trade-off between employment at the firm level and wage claims is 
more or less intense depending on the level of product differentiation. 
                                                 
9 The arguments that follow are based on analytical investigations that, for sake of space, are omitted and are 
available from the authors upon request.   14 
Moreover, the direction of the relationship between the intensity of the trade-off and the 
product  differentiation  degree  depends  on  whether  the  union  structure  is  centralized  or 
decentralized.  In  the  latter  case,  the  higher  the  degree  of  substitutability,  the  more  likely  the 
response of the labour demand to increasing wages is negative. As a consequence, firm-specific 
unions dampen their wage claims irrespective from the competition regime in the product market. 
By contrast, under a centralized union, the relationship between the intensity of the trade-off 
and  the  product  differentiation  degree  depends  crucially  on  the  mode  of  competition.
10 Under 
Cournot,  the  negative  effect  of  increasing  wages  on  employment  increases  when  competition 
(products substitutability) decreases. This means that lower degrees of competition dampen wage 
claims  and  this  is  in  stark  contrast  with  the  case  of  decentralized  unions.  Under  Bertrand 
competition, instead, an increase in competition plays the role to “amplify” (“dampen”) the negative 
effect of wage increases on the employment when the outstanding degree of product differentiation 
is sufficiently high (low). This implies that an increase of product substitutability is associated to 
relatively higher (lower) wage claims when product differentiation is high (low).
11 
To sum up, the above arguments imply that in the case of Cournot competition and central 
union  a  fiercer  product  competition  (a  higher  γ)  reduces  profits  more  than  in  the  case  with 
exogenous wages. This is because the “union wage effect” adds to the standard competition effect. 
By  contrast,  in  all  other  cases  such  effects  operate  one  against  the  other  in  affecting  profits. 
However, which effect is able to outweigh the other needs to be investigated more in detail. 
 
Result 1 [Cournot & firm-specific unions]. Under Cournot competition, firm-specific unions and 
labour decreasing returns, firms’ profits always decrease for increasing market competition (i.e. 




A    
2 (   2)+ 4 . By differentiating (23) with respect to the degree of product 
differentiation γ, we get: 
 
                                                 
10 It is worth noting that, due to the presence in this context of decreasing returns to labour, such results are at 
odds  with  the  well-known  “wage  rigidity  result”  (Dhillon  and  Petrakis  2002),  according  to  which  a 
monopoly central union always charges the same wage independently from the regime and the degree of 
competition in the product market. 
11 These opposite effects depend crucially on the fact that under Bertrand competition and decreasing returns 








2 2(2+ A)(2  )(A+   )+    2+ (2  )  + A [ ] [ ]
2A 2+  (2  )+ A [ ]
3 < 0, 
  
     (0,1) and     (0,2). □ 
 
Hence, when firms compete à la Cournot in the product market, the endogenous wage effect 
that, with firm-specific unions, operates in reducing the wage when γ increases, is not sufficiently 
strong (with respect to the competition effect) to overturn the standard result according to which 
profits decrease with increasing competition. 
 
Result 2 [Bertrand & firm-specific unions]. Under Bertrand competition, firm-specific unions 
and labour decreasing returns, provided that unions are sufficiently more wage- than employment-
oriented, there exist a range for γ ∈ (0,1) for which firms’ profits increase with γ. 
 
Unfortunately,  the  nonlinearity  of  the  expression  for  firms’  profit  under  Bertrand 
competition (see (24)) prevents us from using algebraic methods to derive a formal proof of Result 
2. However, we can refer to numerical simulations, which are graphically illustrated by Figure 1 




Fig. 1. Bertrand competition and firm-specific unions: profits’ behavior according to γ in {γ-θ} space 
(α = 2) 
 
   16 
Indeed,  in  Figure  1  a  graphical  analysis  of  Result  2  is  provided,  by  plotting  as  profits 
(related to the case under discussion) behave as a function of γ (∂π/∂γ) for different γ-θ pairs and for 
a selected value of α (α = 2).
12 In particular, the pairs belonging to the grey (white) area imply that 
profits increase (decrease) as the degree of product differentiation increases (i.e. competition in the 
product market increases). Hence, from the figure it clearly emerges that if θ is sufficiently low we 
get the conventional result that profits always decrease when product differentiation decreases (i.e. 
competition increases). However, starting from a given threshold for θ the “reversal result” begins 
to apply and, as θ increases, the range for γ ∈ (0,1) for which profits increase with competition 
becomes larger and larger. 
 
Result  3  [Cournot  &  central  union].  Under  Cournot  competition,  central  union  and  labour 
decreasing  returns,  firms’  profits  always  decrease  for  increasing  market  competition  (i.e. 
decreasing product differentiation). 
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3 < 0,  
  
     (0,1) and     (0,2). □ 
 
Notice that Result 3 was expected a fortiori, since, in this case, we knew from Lemma 3 that, 
when  product  differentiation  decreases,  the  endogenous  wage  effect  strengthens  the  standard 
competition effect in reducing profits. 
 
Result  4  [Bertrand  &  central  union].  Under Bertrand competition, central union and labour 
decreasing  returns,  firms’  profits  increase  for  increasing  market  competition  (i.e.  decreasing 
product differentiation), provided that the central union is rather wage-oriented, that is for θ > 1.6, 
and γ is higher than a given threshold, which (negatively) depends on θ. 
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12 Notice that α does not affect the sign of 
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where 
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     (0,1) and     (0,2). 
By recalling Lemma 3, the necessary condition for profits to be increasing with γ is that γ > 
0.5. Furthermore, for any given γ, the value of B depends on θ. In particular, by solving B with 
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Notice that, if γ = 0.5, 
  
  = 2 while, if γ → 1, 
  
   1.6. Hence, considering that B is always 
increasing in θ and increasing in γ for any 
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Fig.2. Bertrand competition with central (vs. firm-specific) union: profits’ behaviour according to γ in 
{γ-θ} space (α = 2) 
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Figure 2 above provides a graphical illustration of Result 4 (similarly to the case of firm-
specific unions, represented in Figure 1, α does not affect the sign of 
  
  B
C    and it has been set 
equal  to  2).  In  particular,  the  γ-θ  pairs  for  which  the  reversal  result  applies  under  Bertrand 
competition  and  central  union  are  those  located  in  the  top-right  corner  of  the  box,  which  is 
delimitated by the solid curve and where both γ’s and θ’s values are sufficiently large. Moreover, 
the higher the weight the central union places on wages (with respect to employment), the larger the 
range of γ’s values for which the unconventional result holds true. In particular, when θ is only 
slightly higher than 1.6, profits increase with competition only if γ is very close to one, while if θ is 
approaching to 2, this unconventional result already applies as soon as γ exceeds 0.5. 
Finally, also notice that if we compare the range of γ-θ values for which the reversal result 
applies with central union and firm-specific unions, respectively, it arises that in the former case the 
unconventional result may occur but with a lower probability, as well as a lower “intensity”, than in 
the latter. This clearly appears in Figure 2 where the range of values for which the reversal result 
applies with central union is a subset of that (delimitated by the dotted curve taken from Figure 1) 
for which it occurs under firm-specific unions. 
 
 
5  Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper we have investigated if the conventional wisdom, that an increase in the degree of 
competition linked to a decrease of product differentiation always reduces firms’ profits, remains 
true in a unionized duopoly model with labour decreasing returns. In this context, mixed results 
have  arisen.  This  is  because,  when  product  differentiation  decreases  and  competition  becomes 
fiercer, further than the standard competition effect (that always tends to reduce profits), another 
effect, which indirectly operates via wages, affects profits. Furthermore, this indirect effect, that we 
have termed endogenous or union wage effect, operates differently over wages, hence over profits, 
depending on both the mode of competition in the product market (i.e. competition in quantities or 
in prices) and the particular unionization structure (i.e. industry-wide or firm-specific unions). In 
this regard, the following table summarizes our main findings by showing the sign of different 
effects of decreasing product differentiation (or increasing competition) on profits and suggesting 
that, only under Bertrand competition, the endogenous wage effect may outweigh the competition 
effect, hence reversing (for some degree of product differentiation) the conventional wisdom. 
 











Firm-specific  –  +  –  Cournot 
Central  –  –  – 
Firm-specific  –  +  +/–  Bertrand 
Central  –  +/–  +/– 
Tab. 1. Effects of increasing competition (decreasing product differentiation) on profits 
 
To sum up, the essential message deriving from this work is that, under decreasing returns to 
labour and sufficiently wage-oriented unions (regardless of whether centralized or decentralized), 
fiercer product market competition (linked to a decrease of the degree of product differentiation) 
and profits may be, unexpectedly, positively linked when firms compete in prices. Instead, if firms 
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